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Abstract
We present a quantum version of a cipher used in cryptography where
the message to be communicated is encoded into the relative phase of a
quantum state using the shared key. The encoded quantum information
carrying the message is actually sent to the recepient over a quantum
channel, assuming the proper secrecy of shared key between peers.
1 Introduction
The one-time pad, also known as the Vernam Cipher, invented and patented[1, 2]
by Gilbert Vernam in 1917, is a perfect cipher.[1, 2, 3] The core idea is that any
message can be transformed into any cipher (of the same length) by a pad, such
that all transformations are equally likely. The one-time pad encryption scheme
is provably unbreakable if (i) the key is at least the size of the plaintext, (ii)
the key is truly random, and(iii) the key is used only once. The requirement of
only one time key usage makes the one-time pad impractical when the amount
of date to be securely communicated is huge.
The more practical ciphers are the block ciphers, like DES, 3DES, AES[4],
which operate on a block of message depending on the key size. A given key
is reused for mutiple message blocks. This makes the cipher prone to various
kinds of attacks, like the cloning attack, cryptanalysis attack, chosen cipher-
text/plaintext attack etc. The security of these ciphers depend mainly upon
the strength of the key (randomness) and the algorithm used for encryption
and decryption in terms of confusion and diffusion created.
In 1984, Charles H. Bennett and Gilles Brassard described the first com-
pletely secure quantum key distribution algorithm often known as the BB84
algorithm.[5] And in 1997, Peter Shor[6] provided a quantum algorithm that
can break the widely used RSA system, using quantum computers, with re-
markable ease. Together the developments showed that a completely secure,
efficient, and fast means of delivering confidential information is achievable us-
ing the laws of quantum mechanics and quantum computers. Ciphers based on
quantum states, therefore, would be more appropriate because of the property
that an unknown state cannot be copied. Hence, none of the attacks in classical
cryptography would be applicable here. In recent times there are many at-
tempts and constructions for quantum ciphers. One such attempt was made by
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Abdullha, A. A. et. al.[7], where they used quantum random number generator
and half adder for encryption and transmit with the help of BB84 protocol.
In this paper, a quantum version of the cipher is proposed, which utilizes the
benefit of superior delivery efficiency provided by modern telecommunication,
and snoop-detection capability of the BB84 algorithm. The quantum version
exploits the fact that (1) an unknown quantum state cannot be cloned and (2)
its relative phase cannot be measured. The message to be sent is encoded into
a quantum state by altering the relative phase using a pre-established shared
key, via BB84 or any other quantum key distribution protocol. The informa-
tion transmitted is a quantum superposition state with uniform probability and
relative phase distribution.
2 The algorithm
The proposed algorithm requires a pre-established shared key between the com-
municating parties, which can be achieved by the BB84 or similar QKD (Quan-
tum Key Distribution) protocol. It is assumed that QKD is secured enough and
it would be hard to know any information about key.
The components of the proposed cryptosystem (encoder and decoder)
1. Hadamard transformation.
2. Oracle, Λk defined in section 1.2, responsible for key state phase inversion.
3. Another oracle, Υk,d defined in section 1.3, for multiple phase inversion.
are captured in the following Figure 1.
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The message |m〉 to be sent is first passed through a Hadamard transforma-
tion to create an equal superposition state. Next, the phase inversion is applied
to invert the key state phase. Finally the multiple phase inversion transforma-
tion (another Oracle) is applied to invert the phases of exactly half of the basis
states. The outcome of this is an encrypted quantum state |ψc〉 with a uniform
probability and relative phase distributions. The transmitted quantum state
act as a carrier for the message, analogous to the FM transmission, where the
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audio wave to be transmitted is encoded in the frequency of a high frequency
carrier wave.
The recipient can apply the transformation to |ψc〉 in reverse, the multiple
phase inversion followed by the key phase inversion and finally the Hadamard
transformation, to retrieve the original message |m〉.
2.1 Hadamard transformation
The Hadamard transformation, irrespective of the input, creates an equal su-
perposition state, i.e. a uniform distribution of all possible n-qubit states of the
message space, say M, of size N = 2n.
|ψm〉 = H⊗n(|m〉) = 1√
N
N−1∑
x=0
(−1)m.x|x〉 (1)
2.2 Key phase inversion
The phase inversion operator, (Λk), acts as an oracle and is defined as
Λk = I − 2|k〉〈k| (2)
where |k〉 is the quantum key state derived from the shared key k and I the
identity operator.
The application of this operator on the input state |ψm〉, equation (1), creates
a coupling between the input state and the key state.
|ψ′c〉 = Λk|ψm〉 = I|ψm〉 − 2
1√
N
N−1∑
x=0
(−1)m.x|k〉〈k|x〉
= |ψm〉 − 2√
N
(−1)m.k|k〉 (3)
This marking of the key state accomplishes the encoding.
The application of the same operator retrieves the input state |ψm〉,
Λk|ψ
′
c〉 = (I − 2|k〉〈k|)(|ψm〉 −
2√
N
(−1)m.k|k〉)
= |ψm〉 − 2√
N
(−1)m.k|k〉 − 2√
N
(−1)m.k|k〉+ 4√
N
(−1)m.k|k〉
= |ψm〉 (4)
2.3 Multiple phase inversion
The multiple phase inversion transformation, say Υk,d, performs phase inversion
of multiple basis states as follows.
1. Select one r, where r|N (r divides N) and r < N2 . Now say, d = Nr , where
N = 2n for n qubits.
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2. Start with the key k position of the state |ψ′c〉 and invert the phases of
next d consecutive states, i.e. states |(k+pd) mod N〉 to |(k+(p+1)d−1)
mod N〉. Skip the next d states from |(k + (p + 1)d) mod N〉 to |(k +
(p + 2)d− 1) mod N〉. Here 0 ≤ p ≤ N2d and p ∈ N ∪ 0, here N is set of
natural numbers.
The transformation can be defined as,
|ψc〉 = Υk,d|ψ
′
c〉 (5)
The distribution of inverted vs. non-inverted phase states (|ψc〉, being the
complete superposed states) will vary on each unique choice of key state and d.
Hence, the guessing of the state distribution is not possible in this construction.
It can be easily visualized that with this algorithm, phases of half of the basis
states will be inverted. ′d′ can be uniquely defined for a given key and can be
arrived at as part of the key exchange process.
2.4 Security
The key state phase inversion operator, Λk defined by equation (2), when applied
to the state |ψm〉, resulted in the inversion of the key state |k〉 as given by
equation (3). It can be rewritten as follows,
|ψ′c〉 = Λk|ψm〉
= |ψm〉 − 2√
N
(−1)m.k|k〉
= |ψm−k〉 − 1√
N
(−1)m.k|k〉 (6)
where |ψm−k〉 = |ψm〉− 1√
N
|k〉 is the superposition of all the basis states, except
the key state.
The probability of the phase inverted key state be Pk =
1
N
and each of the
remaining (N − 1) non-inverted states (∀x ∈ |x〉, k /∈ x) be Px = 1N . The ratio
of the probability of inverted and non-inverted states
Pk
Px
=
N
N
= 1 (7)
is probabilistically indistinguishable in this case.
The adversary can only see the transmitted state as given equation 3, he/she
has the power to apply Hadamard transform on the transmitted state. However,
since adversary does not know the shared key state |k〉, Λk remains private,
applying Hadamard transform cannot return back the original message state
|ψm〉. The adversary can only guess the construction of Λk in O(
√
N) running
time.
Alternatively, adversary can set up chosen plaintext attack by apply inver-
sion against mean operator (Ref: Grover’s inversion against mean) to check if
it could leak some information, or can guess any inherent biasness.
4
Let us introduce the inversion against mean operator defind as µm = (2|ψm〉〈ψm|−
I), where |ψm〉 is total state. The inner product of key state and total state is
given by ψm|k〉 = 〈k|ψm〉 = 1√
N
. The application of µm to |ψ′c〉 the will result
in
|φm〉 = µm|ψ
′
c〉 = (2|ψm〉〈ψm| − I)(|ψm〉 −
2√
N
|k〉)
= 2|ψm〉〈ψm|ψm〉 − 2 2√
N
|ψm〉〈ψm|k〉 − (|ψm〉+ 2√
N
|k〉)
= (1− 4
N
)|ψm〉+ 2√
N
|k〉 (8)
Let us choose one use case having message having all 0 i.e. |ψ0〉 = H⊗n(|00...0〉).
Equation 8 can then be rewritten as:
|φ0〉 = (1− 4
N
)|ψ0〉+ 2√
N
|k〉 (9)
To extract out non-inverted phase states, equation 6 is used in equation 9
and we get
|φ〉 = (1− 4
N
)|ψ0〉+ 2√
N
|k〉
= (1− 4
N
)|ψ0−k〉+
(1− 4
N
)√
N
|k〉+ 2√
N
|k〉
= (1− 4
N
)|ψ0−k〉+ 3N − 4
N
√
N
|k〉 (10)
The probability of the phase inverted state is therefore given by Pk =
(3N−4
N
√
N
)2 and each of the remaining (N−1) non-inverted states (∀x ∈ |x〉, k /∈ x)
by Px =
(1− 4
N
)2
N
. Looking for the same probability ratio yields
Pk
Px
=
(3N−4
N
√
N
)2
(1− 4
N
)2
N
= (
3N − 1
N − 4 )
2
= (
3− 4
N
1− 4
N
)2 (11)
which, for large N , will reduce to lim Pk
Px
→ 9.
It is noticed that there is a biasness of probability distribution between phase
inverted state and non-inverted state. The adversary has the freedom to apply
µ0 again on the output of first µ0 operation, if doing so, it will be observed from
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the below result that the encrypted transmitted state would be emerged.
|φ〉 = (2|ψ0〉〈ψ0| − I)(1− 4
N
)|ψ0〉+ 2√
N
|k〉
= (1− 4
N
)|ψ0〉+ 4
N
|ψ0〉 − 2√
N
|k〉
= |ψ0〉 − 2√
N
|k〉 (12)
So, with the repeated use of µ0, would emerge the above alternative pattern
(alternative repeation of eqution 8 equation 12). Though, the adversary cannot
be able to make out any useful infomarion but it shows a little biasness in
probability distribution of the inverted key states over rest of the individual
(non-inverted) message states. This violates the Shannon’s secrecry clause for
encryption[8].
In order to solve the biasness problem, we could phase invert M states and
M > 1. The objective is to show that if M = N2 the biasness can be eliminated
and we could show the inverted phase states and the rest of the states will be
indistinguishable.
Multiple phase inversion is actually a chain of single phase inversion of M
times with the corresponding phase inversion states are |k1〉, |k2〉, ...|km〉, these
states remain private between the communicating parties.
(I − 2|k1〉〈k1|)|ψm〉 = |ψm〉 − 2√
N
(−1)m.k1 |k1〉
(I − 2|k2〉〈k2|)(|ψm〉 − 2√
N
(−1)m.k1 |k1〉) = |ψm〉 − 2√
N
(−1)m.k1 |k1〉 − 2√
N
(−1)m.k2 |k2〉
...
similarly goes on up to M states and the final would look like
(I − 2|km〉〈km|)(|ψm〉 − 2√
N
(−1)m.k1 |k1〉
− 2√
N
(−1)m.k2 |k2〉
...
− 2√
N
(−1)m.km−1 |km−1〉)
= |ψm〉 − 2√
N
(−1)m.k1 |k1〉 − 2√
N
(−1)m.k2 |k2〉
...− 2√
N
(−1)m.km |km〉 (13)
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Without any loss of generality, this can be expressed as
|φ〉 = Λk|ψm〉 = |ψm〉 − 2√
N
M−1∑
i=0
(−1)m.ki |ki〉
= |ψm−k〉 − 1√
N
M−1∑
i=0
(−1)m.ki |ki〉 (14)
Now, the probability of the M consolidated phase inverted key states is
Pk =M.(
1√
N
)2 and (N −M) non-inverted states Px = (N −M).( 1√
N
)2 and the
ratio
Pk
Px
=
M
(N −M) (15)
which reduces to Pk
Px
= 1 when M = N2 .
Thus proved that there is no biasness in probability distribution betweenM
phase inverted states with the rest of the non-inverted states. Since adversary
does not know the shared key state |k〉, Λk remains private, applying Hadamard
transform on the transmitted message will not reveal any information. The
adversary, however can chose to apply inversion against mean operator (Ref:
Grover’s inversion against mean) to launch ’chosen plaintext attack’, taking
the similar argumental approach as used during single phase inversion analysis
(changing notation of ψm to ψ0),
|φ〉 = µ0|ψ0〉 = (2|ψ0〉〈ψ0| − I)(|ψ0〉 − 2√
N
M−1∑
i=0
(−1)m.ki |ki〉
= 2|ψ0〉〈ψ0|ψ0〉 − 2 2√
N
M−1∑
i=0
(−1)m.ki |ψ0〉〈ψ0|ki〉 − (|ψ0〉+ 2M√
N
|k〉)
= (1− 4M
N
)|ψ0〉+ 2√
N
M−1∑
i=0
(−1)m.ki |ki〉 (16)
Since |ψ0〉 = N−M√
N
|ψ0−k〉 + M√
N
|k〉, to extract inverted and non-inverted
phase states, equation 16 can be re-written as:
|φ〉 = (1 − 4M
N
)|ψ0〉+ 2√
N
M−1∑
i=0
(−1)m.ki |ki〉
= (1 − 4M
N
)|ψm−k〉+ ((1 − 4M
N
)
1√
N
+
2√
N
)
M−1∑
i=0
(−1)m.ki |ki〉 (17)
The probability of consolidated M phase inverted states is then Pk = M((1 −
4M
N
). 1√
N
+ 2√
N
)2 and for the N −M non-inverted states Px = (N −M).((1 −
4M
N
). 1√
N
)2.
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The ratio of probabilities is thus
Pk
Px
=
M((1 − 4M
N
). 1√
N
+ 2√
N
)2
(N −M).((1− 4M
N
). 1√
N
)2
(18)
and when M = N2 , it reduces to
Pk
Px
= |
N
2
N
2
| = 1 (19)
With this construction, we can show that again, the relative probability
distribuion is not altered by no mens and hence no biasness.
The above algorithm is secure against ’chosen plaintext’ attack. Even if there
will be single phase inversion, being phase inversion operator as private, key is
safe to use O(
√
N) times in a session. The transmitted message is an equal
superposition state with some co-relation to the key k. Without the knowledge
of the key nothing can be inferred about the messageM . To make it completely
hardened, approximately half of the total phases of the Hadamard transformed
message state should be inverted.
2.5 Steps of the algorithm
The algorithm has the following steps:
1. Begin with the BB84 (Bennett and Brassard) quantum key distribution
(QKD) method to establish a shared key k and d between two communi-
cating parties (say A and B). Let the key state be |k〉.
2. To each message,m ∈M , ’A’ will apply the Hadamard transform to create
an equal superposition state |ψm〉.
|ψm〉 = H⊗n(|m〉) = 1√
N
N−1∑
x=0
(−1)m.x|x〉
3. Apply the operator Λk to |ψm〉 to mark the key state.
ψ
′
c = Λk|ψm〉 = |ψm〉 − 2|k〉
4. Apply the multiple phase inversion operator Υk,d to invert phases of mul-
tiple basis states.
|ψc〉 = Υk,d|ψ
′
c〉
5. Send the resulting encrypted quantum state |ψc〉 to ’B’ using a quantum
channel.
6. ’B’ will perform the reverse operation to retrieve the messagem from |ψc〉.
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2.6 Application of proposed cipher
Some applications of the proposed cipher construction are as follow.
2.6.1 Authentication
Anyone can utilize this algorithm to encode and send his/her signature (public
identity) as the message. The intended peer can decode the signature and
verify against the known one. Any tampering of the message would result in
a different signature, i.e. only a entity with the share key in possession can
generate the encoded signature. For authenticated encrypted message however,
total message length will be 2n with one part of n bearing the identity for
signature verification.
2.6.2 Quantum Teleportation
This can be used during quantum teleportation. ’Alice’ no longer needs to use
phone or email to communicate ’Bob’ her state of operation. Instead, she can
send our cipher to Bob and Bob can ’decrypt’ to get the message what Alice
had performed and act accordingly to get the teleported message. Thus, we can
eradicate all classical entities involved in quantum teleportation.
2.6.3 Rekey
This can be used to refresh the shared key established by the BB84 QKD. The
newly generated random key |k1〉 can be communicated to the peer as a message
in our cipher construction using the existing key |k〉. Aferwards, |k1〉 will be the
new key and will be used for next set of message encryption and decryption. In
the whole process, BB84 QKD protocol is used only once.
Conclusion
The proposed quantum cipher is proved mathematically secured against known
attacks (more relevant in the current context ’chosen plaintext attack’) and can
be versatile in application. The requirement of a well secure cipher, namely
diffusion and confusion, is satisfied by the Hadamard and multiple phase inver-
sion transformations respectively. The same idea can be extended and similar
approach can be used for multi party (multi peers) commuication securely.
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